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Three experiments were conducted to explore the specificity of the contrast 
effect in judgments of psychopathology. In the first two studies, respondents 
initially attempted to infer whether each item in a series of behavior samples 
(vocabulary definitions in one study, handwriting samples in the second) came 
from a schizophrenic or a nonschizophrenic patient. Some respondents were 
presented with highly pathological samples in this induction series, while others 
were presented with relatively nonpathological samples. These divergent expe- 
riences led to marked contrast effects in evaluating test stimuli from the Same 
behavioral domain (e.g., additional vocabulary definitions), but had significantly 
less impact on the respondents’ reactions to stimuli from a different domain 
(e.g., handwriting samples). A third experiment yielded similar results, using a 
paired-comparison methodology. In this study subjects first judged a series of 
high- vs low-pathology definitions. They were then presented with a series of 
matched stimulus pairs, each including one vocabulary definition and one hand- 
writing sample. Respondents were to indicate the member of each pair that 
seemed more indicative of schizophrenia. People assigned to the high-pathology 
induction group typically chose the handwriting samples as being more indicative 
of schizophrenia, compared with respondents who were assigned to the low- 
pathology conditions. These results were interpreted as supporting a representational 
(perceptual) theory of contrast. 
Studies of social judgment have repeatedly demonstrated the replicability 
of the contrast effect. In evaluating a given stimulus (e.g., how heavy 
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is this weight? Or, how serious is this crime?), the stimulus being judged 
is normally displaced “away” from the bulk of the judge’s recent ex- 
perience. Thus, a respondent who has been assigned to an experimental 
condition that requires him or her to judge the weight of several pre- 
dominantly light objects, will normally rate “midscale” stimuli as being 
heavier than a judge who has been assigned to a series of predominantly 
heavy weights. This contrast pattern has been observed in a wide range 
of studies, involving both psychophysical and social stimuli. 
Despite its robust generality, however, the contrast phenomenon has 
been difficult to explain unequivocally. Two main interpretations have 
emerged. (a) Some investigators have followed Helson’s lead (1964) in 
viewing contrast as a centrally mediated (“perceptual”) phenomenon. 
According to this account, the “midscale” weight in our previous example 
simply feels heavier when one has been lifting a series of relatively light 
weights. (b) Other investigators (e.g., Anderson, 1975; Parducci, 1965; 
Stevens, 1958; Upshaw, 1969) have argued for a “semantic” interpretation, 
contending that contrast effects mainly derive from changes in the subject’s 
use of the response vocabulary (i.e., the rating categories) provided by 
the experimenter. According to this account, then, contrast effects do 
not result from changes in cognitive representation (i.e., the respondent’s 
“immediate experience” of the stimulus); instead, they are thought to 
reflect changes in the way this representation is described (rated). 
Those who support the semantic explanation emphasize three important 
arguments: 
1. The end points of a judgmental rating scale are normally difficult 
(if not impossible) to specify with precision. Thus, in a weight-lifting 
study, the respondent may legitimately be somewhat puzzled in trying 
to determine just what the experimenter means by “extremely light” 
and “extremely heavy” weights (if these are to function as the end 
anchors of the rating scale). In such a situation he/she may simply position 
the end anchors to fit the range of stimuli that the experimenter has 
provided; subjects who have been assigned to divergent experimental 
conditions may consequently use the response scale in different ways. 
This, in turn, implies that people who have assigned different ratings to 
a given stimulus need not differ in the cognitive representations that 
underlie these ratings. 
2. Respondents in a judgment experiment may implicitly assume that 
they should use the available response categories with roughly equal 
frequency. Hence, a judge who has been exposed to a series of pre- 
dominantly light weights may react to the infrequency with which he/ 
she has used the response categories at the “heavy” end of the scale 
by establishing a lowered threshold for the “heavy” response alternatives 
when such judgments seem at all appropriate. A lowered threshold of 
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this sort could underlie the contrast pattern, even if the subject’s cognitive 
representation (perception) of the test stimuli had been unaffected. 
3. Subjects may respond so as to convey maximal differentiation of 
the stimuli that are presented (Rosenberg & Cohen, 1966). This may 
sometimes lead to the inhibition of reactions that are implicitly evoked, 
because the response in question is associated both with the stimulus 
then being judged and with other (similar) stimuli that the respondent 
has previously evaluated. According to this account, then, a subject who 
has rated a series of predominantly light weights may for a time inhibit 
his/her subsequent use of “light” ratings, since such responses, if emitted, 
might not reflect the perceived difference between the earlier (“light”) 
stimuli, and the stimulus then being judged. This shift in “labeling rules” 
would of course, depend upon the subject’s prior experience in the 
judgmental situation, and might account for the contrast effects that are 
so ubiquitously reported. 
Previous investigators addressing this controversy have sometimes 
taken special care to select response measures that would (hopefully) be 
stably related to the respondent’s cognitive representation. For example, 
in a study by Krantz and Campbell (1961), two groups of respondents 
were to estimate the length of a series of lines, in inches. The assumption 
here was that “number of inches” is a familiar response language that 
would be firmly linked to the respondent’s subjective experience, regardless 
of the experimental treatment to which he/she had been assigned. This 
study yielded significant contrast effects (Subjects exposed to long lines 
estimated that lines of intermediate length were shorter than these same 
lines seemed to respondents who had been exposed to predominantly 
short lines). While this experiment is often regarded as requiring a per- 
ceptual interpretation, a skeptic might worry about the possibility that 
the obtained results may have derived from the subjects’ attempts to use 
a wide variety of responses (see 1 and 2, above). 
Manis (1971) has reported several experiments that attempted to bypass 
the traditional rating scale methodology and many of its attendant problems. 
In one study (Manis, 1967), subjects read a series of written descriptions 
based on posed emotions (e.g., fear, surprise). The respondents’ task 
was to read each description, and then indicate the particular photograph 
(out of several alternatives) on which it was based. In induction trials, 
some respondents read descriptions of relatively unpleasant emotions, 
while others read descriptions of pleasant emotions. A clear-cut contrast 
effect was observed on a series of intermittent “test trials,” when the 
two groups were presented with descriptions of neutral emotions (neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant). On these trials, subjects assigned to the unpleasant 
induction condition selected referent photographs that were rated as more 
pleasant (by a norm group) than the photographs selected by the pleasant 
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group. While these data were interpreted as supporting the view that the 
induction passages affected the cognitive representations of the test stimuli, 
they do not adequately address the problems posed by the equal frequency 
response bias, and by Rosenberg and Cohen’s differentiation hypothesis. 
More recent work by Schneiderman and Manis (1978) suggests, however, 
that the contrast effects observed in this situation may indeed derive (at 
least in part) from central mechanisms. Studies by Krupat (1974) and by 
Simpson and Ostrom (1976), using very different experimental techniques, 
support a similar conclusion. 
A series of studies by Mellers and Birnbaum (1982) is consistent with 
a more complex account, however. Respondents in one experiment judged 
the darkness of various stimulus squares. While a common subset of 
“test” squares was presented to all respondents, these stimuli were 
presented in disparate contexts. Some respondents were presented with 
an overall set of squares that was positively skewed with respect to 
darkness, while for others the stimulus distribution was negatively skewed. 
The two groups of respondents (positive vs negative skew) showed clear 
evidence of contrast when judging the common test stimuli. Subsequent 
research suggested, however, that these results might derive from dif- 
ferences in the respondents’ “‘judgment function”; i.e., from a “semantic” 
shift in response language, rather than from changes in the representations 
(subjective scale values) of the individual test stimuli. On the other hand, 
when the judgment task required subjects to react to stimuli from two 
modalities (e.g., on each of several trials, some subjects were instructed 
to compare the size of a certain circle with the darkness of a square), 
a representational effect was observed. The results of this bimodality 
experiment suggested, in essence, that the representations of the individual 
test squares (how dark they looked) were affected by the overall array 
of squares that were presented in the course of the experiment. A conceptual 
replication of this work by Mellers (1982, Experiment 4) yielded similar 
results. In this study respondents judged the fairness of the compensation 
awarded to hypothetical faculty members, by comparing their salaries 
and their merit ratings. 
This report is concerned with the specificity (vs generality) of the 
contrast phenomenon. Consider a situation in which respondents are 
provided with behavior samples that are to be used in estimating the 
psychopathology of the various individuals who produced these samples. 
Suppose moreover, that in an initial series of (context) judgments, some 
respondents are presented with predominantly “high-pathology” vocab- 
ulary definitions, while others receive “low-pathology” definitions. What 
will be the effect of these divergent contexts on subsequent judgments 
of psychopathology, when the respondents are presented with (a) additional 
vocabulary items and (b) with handwriting samples? A serendipitous 
finding in a previous experiment suggested that such judgments might 
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be essentially unaffected by the respondent’s assigned “context condition” 
(high vs low pathology), unless the test stimuli were similar to the context 
stimuli; e.g., both vocabulary definitions. 
The present experiments were designed to explore the robustness of 
that earlier finding. Parducci, Knoble, and Thomas (1976) have reported 
what appears to be a related result, using geometric forms (circles and 
squares) as stimuli. Their respondents rated the size of various stimuli 
from an intermingled series that included relatively small squares and 
somewhat larger circles. Subjects were instructed to establish a separate 
scale of size for the two types of stimuli, so that a square might be 
judged as “very large” (relative to the squares), and a circle as “very 
small” (relative to the circles), even though the circle in question was 
larger than the square. The results of this experiment indicated that the 
skewness of the stimuli within a given domain (e.g., squares) had a 
systematic effect on the judgments that were elicited by the other stimuli 
in that domain, with positive skewing leading to higher ratings than 
negative skewing (contrast). On the other hand, the judgments observed 
in one domain were independent of the skewness of the stimulus distribution 
in the other. In essence, then, in judging a particular stimulus (e.g., a 
square), the subjects in this study displayed contrast-like effects that 
depended on the overall array of squares that were included in the 
stimulus series. However, as in our own preliminary research (see above), 
the results observed by Parducci et al. were “domain specific,” for 
judgments elicited by one type of stimulus (squares) were not affected 
by the distribution of stimuli in the other domain (circles). 
The present report presents the results of three experiments in which 
respondents who had previously been exposed to divergent induction 
conditions rated the cognitive distortions implied in two types of behavior 
samples: vocabulary definitions and handwriting samples. In Experiments 
1 and 2 the respondents rated each behavior sample separately. Experiment 
3 involved a paired-comparison procedure; that is, in a series of test 
trials, subjects compared the psychopathology implied by a given definition 
with that implied by a matched handwriting sample. 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
Experiments 1 and 2 were very similar in design. They were undertaken 
to assess the replicability of the data pattern that we had previously 
obtained (see above). In both cases, subjects were initially exposed to 
either a high-pathology or a low-pathology series of behavior samples 
(vocabulary definitions in one experiment, handwriting samples in the 
other), each of which was supposedly obtained from a different “patient.” 
For each stimulus the respondents were to indicate if they thought that 
the patient in question was schizophrenic or not. Following this induction 
phase, all respondents were presented with additional behavior samples 
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(the test series) which were said to be “randomly selected” from the 
same hospital as the initial series. Each test item was to be judged in 
terms of (a> the amount of thought distortion that it implied, (b) the 
patient’s diagnosis (schizophrenic vs not schizophrenic), and (c) the re- 
spondent’s con$dence in his/her answer to item (b). 
There were two types of test items in each experiment: handwriting 
samples and vocabulary definitions. Experiment 1 involved a between- 
subjects design; during the test phase of the experiment, half of the 
subjects from each induction condition (high vs low pathology) were 
presented with the vocabulary definitions and the other half with the 
handwriting samples. Experiment 2 involved a within-subjects design in 
which all respondents evaluated both types of test items, presented in 
an unpredictable sequence. The main difference between Experiments 
1 and 2 lay in the type of material that was presented during induction. 
In Experiment 1 all respondents received an induction series that was 
composed of vocabulary definitions (high vs low pathology); in Experiment 
2 the induction series involved a variety of handwriting samples (each 
patient had supposedly written the words “father” and “mother”). In 
both Experiments I and 2 there were two main groups of respondents. 
One group received an induction series that was relatively pathological 
(as evaluated by a norm group); a second group was presented with a 
nonpathological induction series. 
Method 
Subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 were both conducted using students at the University of 
Michigan as respondents. These people were paid for their participation. In each experiment, 
half the respondents assigned to a given experimental condition (e.g., high-pathology induction) 
were male and half were female (N, = 72. Nz = 36). Subjects were normally run in small 
groups (2-7). with some people tested individually. 
Induction booklets. In both experiments, subjects were told that the study was concerned 
with “social judgments.” In study 1, they were initially shown a series of 6 midrange 
definitions (as a warm-up), followed without delay by 20 “extreme” definitions, one to a 
page; these definitions were to be used in deciding if the patient in question was schizophrenic 
or not-a simple two-category choice. Respondents were given 10 set to react to each of 
these items. They were told that the definitions in the booklet came from “a representative 
cross-section” of the patients in a state hospital. Unknown to the respondents, there were 
two different induction booklets, one containing relatively pathological definitions (scale 
positions ranged from 8.00 to 10.68 on an 11-point scale), while the other contained less- 
pathological definitions (1.50 to 3.95 on the rating scale). These items and their associated 
ratings were taken from an earlier study by Arnhoff (1953). 
In study 2, the induction items were handwriting samples; each “patient” was represented 
by the words mother and father, which had ostensibly been taken from a biographical 
inventory that had been completed at admission. There were 6 midrange items followed 
by 20 “extreme” handwriting samples in each induction booklet. These had previously 
been rated for psychopathology by a norm group, whose mean ratings were used to 
determine the amount of thought disorder that each sample implied. The high-pathology 
induction booklet included 20 handwriting samples whose mean ratings ranged from 7.8 
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to IO.31 on an 1 l-point scale; the low-pathology booklet included 20 handwriting samples 
that ranged between 1.69 and 3.00. 
When the induction booklets had been completed, the respondents in both experiments 
were told that they would receive a second series of stimuli which were also to be rated 
for psychopathology. These test items were presented as deriving from another “representative 
sample” of the patients in the hospital from which the induction series had been drawn. 
Each test item was presented by means of a slide projector. The experimenter tried to 
move to a new test slide each lo-15 set, but waited until each subject in a given test 
session had completed his/her response. In the test series, subjects provided a more 
complete evaluation than was called for in the induction series. For each item, the subjects 
were to indicate: (a) the amount of thought distortion that it implied, using a 7-point scale 
that ranged from 1 (normal) to 7 (highly distorted/disturbed); (b) whether the patient seemed 
schizophrenic or not; and (c) their confidence with respect to the “diagnosis” provided 
in response to (b), using a 7-point scale that ranged from “guess” (1) to “very certain” 
(7). 
Both Experiments 1 and 2 involved two types of test items: vocabulary definitions and 
handwriting samples. In both experiments, the vocabulary test items were located between 
4.1 and 7.8 on the 1 l-point scale that was used to “calibrate” these materials. In Experiment 
1, the handwriting samples fell between 1.7 and 7.1’; in Experiment 2, the handwriting 
samples in the test series were located between 4.1 and 6.6 on our ll-point scale. 
In Experiment 1, each subject responded to 16 test items, the first of which was discarded 
as a “warm-up”; half the subjects assigned to each induction booklet were presented with 
handwriting samples, while the other half were presented with additional vocabulary def- 
initions. In Experiment 2, following the induction series, all respondents were presented 
with a “mixed series” of 38 test items. Half of these items were handwriting samples and 
half were vocabulary definitions, presented in an irregular sequence; the test series included 
two warm-up items (one definition and one handwriting sample), which were discarded 
for purposes of analysis. 
Results 
We initially analyzed our data by looking separately at (a) the subjects’ 
ratings of thought pathology, and (b) their schizophrenic judgment scores, 
an index that combined the respondents ’ “diagnoses” concerning schiz- 
ophrenia and their confidence ratings into a single 14-point scale that 
ranged from (1) “very certain” the patient is not schizophrenic, to (14) 
“very certain” that the patient is schizophrenic. Since measures (a) and 
(b) (above) proved to be highly correlated, they were combined additively 
into a single score (after standardization, to ensure that they would be 
equally weighted). This procedure was followed in both Experiments 1 
and 2. Figure 1 presents the results from both experiments. The vertical 
axis in this figure represents a difference score, comparing the mean 
responses of our two induction groups (low pathology minus high pa- 
’ The handwriting samples in the test series of Experiment 1 extended across a somewhat 
broader range of the psychopathology continuum than the vocabulary definitions with 
which they were compared. However, subsequent research in an additional study (not 
fully reported here) indicates that the results of Experiment 1 are essentially unchanged 
when the test series includes a narrower, truly “midrange” set of writing samples. as in 
Experiments 2 and 3. 
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FIG. 1. Differences in judged psychopathology as a function of type of stimulus (definitions 
versus handwriting samples) and test blocks. 
thology). Data are presented separately for evaluations of the definitions 
and the handwriting samples on three successive blocks of test trials. 
Difference scores that are greater than zero (i.e., positive differences) 
are indicative of a contrast effect. As in our earlier study, these results 
show clear evidence of contrast when the test items came from the same 
domain as the material in the induction series. Thus the respondents in 
Experiment 1 who were “induced” on vocabulary definitions show positive 
difference scores (contrast) in evaluating other vocabulary definitions; a 
similar contrast pattern appears in response to the handwriting samples 
in Experiment 2. In both cases, the contrast effect is most marked at 
the beginning of the test series and then tails off gradually. Now consider 
the “mismatched” test items, those from a different domain than the 
materials in the induction series. Here there is substantially less evidence 
that the induction series affected our respondents’ judgments, for the 
group differences are small and inconsistent from one study to the next. 
To assess the replicability of these patterns, the data from each ex- 
periment were subjected to an appropriate analysis of variance. Experiment 
1 involved a mixed design in which the respondent’s induction condition, 
sex, and type of test item (handwriting vs definitions) were treated as 
between-subject variables, with test blocks constituting a within-subject 
variable. Experiment 2 was analyzed similarly, save for the fact that in 
this case the type of test item was treated as a within-subject variable 
(since each subject received both handwriting samples and definitions). 
The results of these analyses supported the following conclusions: 
1. In both studies, the effect of the respondent’s assigned induction 
treatment (high vs low pathology) depended on the type of test item he/ 
she was evaluating. In Experiment 1 this interaction between treatment 
conditions and item types yielded an F( 1, 64) of 4.3 1, p < .05; this effect 
was qualified, however, by a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 128) 
= 4.70 (induction level x item type x trial block), deriving from the 
fact that the group differences that were initially observed in response 
to the two types of test items had virtually disappeared by trial block 3 
(see Fig. ‘1). Experiment 2 also resulted in a significant three-way interaction 
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between induction, item type, and trial block, F(2, 64) = 6.75, p < .005. 
Examination of Fig. 1 shows that as in Experiment 1, the first block of 
test trials yielded a relatively clear separation between the two types of 
test items in the amount of contrast that they elicited. A subsequent 
analysis of just the block 1 data showed a significant interaction between 
the respondent’s induction level (high vs low) and the type of item being 
evaluated; F(1, 32) = 15.86, p < .OOl; in blocks 2 and 3, on the other 
hand, the two types of test items did not differ reliably in the amount 
of contrast that they elicited (F < 1.00). 
2. In both studies, test items from the same domain as the induction 
series yielded significant evidence of contrast. Thus, in Experiment 1, 
the vocabulary items (considered alone) led to a significant main effect 
for level (high vs low pathology); F(1, 32) = 11.78, p < .005. A similar 
pattern was observed in Experiment 2. Here, the overall contrast effect 
for the handwriting samples yielded an F(1, 32) of 16.71, p < .Ol. 
3. In Experiment 1, respondents assigned to the high- and low-pathology 
groups did not differ (F < 1 JO) in their evaluations of the “mismatched” 
test items (i.e., the handwriting samples). In Experiment 2, on the other 
hand, for the overall set of vocabulary items (considered separately) 
there was a modest but reliable contrast pattern, F(1, 32) = 5.50, p < 
.05. The replicability and generality of this last effect is unclear, however, 
for this pattern has not been found in other studies within the present 
series, nor was it observed in an analogous experiment by Parducci et 
al. (1976), using geometric stimuli. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the presentation of a biased induction 
series, consisting (for example) of distorted, poorly organized vocabulary 
definitions, leads to contrast in estimating the amount of psychopathology 
implied by other stimuli of the same type (e.g., other vocabulary definitions); 
when, however, stimuli from a different domain are evaluated with respect 
to the psychopathology that they imply, the preceding induction experience 
does not have a consistent impact. While this pattern of results seemed 
compatible with an interpretation emphasizing a central (representational) 
mediator, Experiment 3 was designed to provide a more direct assessment 
of this possibility. 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2 where the individual handwriting samples 
and vocabulary definitions of the test series were rated separately, Ex- 
periment 3 involved paired-comparison judgments. Each stimulus pair 
consisted of a vocabulary definition and a (matched) handwriting sample 
that implied about the same amount of psychopathology. The underlying 
rationale for the experiment can perhaps be explained most readily by 
referring to Fig. 2, which depicts the situation confronting a respondent 
who had previously been exposed to a series of well-formed, nonpath- 
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FIG. 2. A schematic representation of the theoretical basis for Experiment 3. 
ological vocabulary definitions (symbolized by arrows D,, D2, . . . D5). 
A representational account of our earlier results suggests that such an 
experience should at least temporarily lead the respondent to “displace” 
subsequent definitions toward the pathological end of the continuum. 
This is symbolized by the arrow running from D to DP (the perceived 
location of our hypothetical test definition). The HW in Fig. 2 represents 
a handwriting sample that is typically seen (by norm subjects) as implying 
about the same degree of psychopathology as the definition with which 
it has been paired. If the representational account of our earlier results 
is correct, we would anticipate that when asked to indicate the more 
pathological of these two behavior samples our hypothetical subject should 
select the definition (D). By analogous reasoning, we would anticipate 
that subjects who are presented with a high-pathology series of definitions 
(during induction) would normally choose the handwriting sample as the 
more pathological of the pair. 
Method 
Experiment 3 was conducted with paid volunteers who were students at the University 
of Michigan. These people were run in small groups, ranging up to 9, with some respondents 
completing the experiment individually. There were 32 subjects, half men and half women 
(8 per cell of each sex). 
Procedure. The subjects’ instructions and initial induction experience were closely modeled 
after Experiment 1. After responding to 20 induction definitions that were presented in a 
booklet (2 midrange “warm-ups” and 18 polarized definitions), each respondent was presented 
with a series of 18 stimulus pairs, each pair consisting of a “midscale” vocabulary definition 
and a handwriting sample that had received about the same “pathology rating” when 
presented to a norm group. For each pair, the respondents were instructed to indicate 
which person was schizophrenic, the “top” person or the “bottom” person of the pair, 
and how confident they were about that choice, using a 7-point scale that ranged from 
“guess” to “very certain.” These test pairs were presented on slides with a subject-paced 
presentation rate (as in Experiments 1 and 2). The definition was presented above its 
matched handwriting sample for half of the test pairs; this ordering was reversed on the 
remaining test items. 
Results 
The results of Experiment 3 are presented in Fig. 3, which compares 
the mean test choices of our two respondent groups (those initially assigned 
to the high- vs the low-pathology definitions). The dependent variable 
in this graph reflects the mean number of choices (out of the six test 
pairs in each trial block) in which the definition was chosen as indicative 
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FIG. 3. Paired comparison judgments as a function of induction (high or low pathology) 
and test blocks. 
of more pathology than its matched handwriting sample. Results are 
presented separately for the two induction conditions. 
These results are quite compatible with Experiments I and 2. That is, 
in evaluating the psychopathology implied by the paired behavior samples, 
there was a clear tendency for respondents in the divergent induction 
groups to differ in their choices. When presented with a test series 
consisting of matched definitions and handwriting samples, those who 
had previously responded to high-pathology definitions (in the induction 
series) were less likely than those in the low-pathology group to select 
the vocabulary definitions as being more “schizophrenic” than the hand- 
writing samples with which they were paired. 
To assess the reliability of these results, the data from Experiment 3 
were subjected to a 2 (induction condition) x 2 (sex) x 3 (trial blocks) 
analysis of variance, with the last of these being a within-subject variable. 
The difference between the two induction groups (high vs low pathology) 
was significant [F( 1, 28) = 6.80, p < .025]. Similar results were obtained 
from an analysis in which the respondents’ choices were weighted by 
their confidence ratings, yielding a 1Cpoint scale that ranged from (1) 
very certain that the handwriting sample was schizophrenic, to (14) very 
certain that the vocabulary definition was schizophrenic. For this weighted 
measure, the overall contrast effect yielded an F( 1, 28) of 7.68 (p < .Ol). 
Perhaps the most important finding in these studies is the relative 
speczjicity of the contrast phenomenon-the fact that it appears quite 
clearly when respondents evaluate stimuli of the same type as those 
presented in the induction series, but does not appear with comparable 
clarity and consistency when stimuli from a different domain are presented 
for evaluation. Judgmental theories that emphasize the shifting character 
of the subject’s response scale do not provide a convincing account for 
these experiments, particularly Experiment 3, where respondents were 
simply asked for paired-comparison judgments. 
Paired comparisons seem less ambiguous than “absolute” ratings in 
many situations. If Smith is rated as ver?, r&i by one rater, and simply 
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as tall by another, we cannot be confident that these two respondents 
differ in their private (phenomenal) impressions; they may well hold to 
a common view of Smith, but may describe that impression in rather 
different terms. On the other hand, if we learn that one judge regards 
Smith as taller than Jones, and that a second judge favors the reverse 
ordering (Jones taller than Smith), we can feel reasonably confident that 
these judges disagree in their cognitive representations. The underlying 
basis for our confidence in this second instance derives, we believe, from 
the plausible idea that for skilled speakers of English, the contrasting 
statements, “Jones is taller than Smith” vs “Smith is taller than Jones,” 
are unlikely to reflect a common (shared) view of the world. Considerations 
of this sort lead us to give special attention to the results of Experiment 
3, where a biased induction series affected our respondents’ subsequent 
reactions to a paired-comparison task. 
If we assume (as above) that the present results reflect systematic 
changes in cognitive representation, it is interesting to speculate as to 
underlying mechanisms that may be involved: 
1. Following in the tradition established by Helson (1964), it might be 
contended that the results of all three experiments reflect representational 
effects, in which the presentation of a biased induction series influenced 
the respondents’ phenomenal reactions to subsequent test items from 
that domain (e.g., other definitions). An account of this sort seems most 
plausible if we assume, for example, that a respondent who had been 
presented with a low-pathology series of definitions during induction, 
would recognize that the midscale “test” definitions were more pathological 
than those that had come before. This recognition (in turn) might lead 
to the inference that the test definitions might reflect a substantial degree 
of psychopathology in some objective sense (e.g., schizophrenia). An 
account of this type emphasizes the possibility that ordinal judgments 
regarding the pathological character of the test definitions relative to the 
induction items may, through an “inferential leap,” affect the respondent’s 
immediate impressions, given that the test items come from the same 
domain as the induction items. 
2. An alternative account focuses primarily on Experiment 3, where 
the evidence for a representational effect seems clearest because of the 
paired-comparison methodology that was used there.’ This account starts 
with the assumption that in considering a given test pair, respondents 
’ The specificity pattern that was observed in Experiments 1 and 2 may, in this view, 
derive from the sort of end-anchoring effects that Upshaw found in his work on congeneric 
scales (1978). In these studies, persuasive manipulations that affected the scale boundaries 
of one response scale were ineffective in affecting other (congeneric) scales. Analogously, 
the manipulation of induction materials in Experiment I may have affected the response 
scale used for labeling (rating) test definitions, without influencing the response scale that 
was used to evaluate handwriting samples. 
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may evaluate the constituent behavior samples separately, assigning each 
item an “implicit rating” based on its standing relative to other items 
of that type (e.g., other definitions); the judge’s choice as to the more 
pathological of the two elements in a pair would then depend on these 
“implicit ratings.” If, for example, the definition seemed relatively path- 
ological compared to other recently seen definitions and the handwriting 
seemed average, the respondent might conclude that the definition implied 
a more severe state of psychopathology than the handwriting sample.3 
This type of account is compatible with the results of an important 
study by Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, and Lynn (1978). These investigators 
demonstrated that the importance ratings assigned to the topic of recycling 
might be systematically influenced (in a contrastive direction) by the 
relative importance of other topics that the respondent had rated. The 
Sherman et al. study showed, moreover, that under appropriate conditions 
of “high saliency,” ratings of the recycling topic were directly related 
to the respondents’ subsequent behavior in volunteering to help a local 
recycling project. The authors concluded that the judgmental pattern 
they had obtained was probably semantic in character (Upshaw, 1969; 
1978), but that this “labeling effect” had ultimately influenced the re- 
spondents’ everyday actions, serving as a behavioral input for self-inference 
(Bern, 1972; Salancik & Conway, 1975). In a similar vein, the “repre- 
sentational effects” that were observed in the paired-comparison task 
(see Fig. 3), may depend on the subjects’ implicit responses to the com- 
ponent behavior samples. Recent research by Mellers (1982) and Mellers 
and Birnbaum (1982) have prompted a similar model, derived from Par- 
ducci’s range-frequency theory (1965); this general approach is also 
consistent with an article by Higgins and Lurie (1983). 
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